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ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF CARTELS: 
A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF COMPETITION 
LAW EXEMPTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, AUSTRALIA 
AND JAPAN 
JACQUELINE BOS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Country borders no longer present a challenge to modern day price fixers 
or boycott cartels. Vitamin manufacturing cartels, graphite electrode price 
fixers and lysine manufacturers are recent examples of colluders that have 
expanded to the four corners of the globe. Antitrust laws, however, have not 
always expanded to follow their targets. The increase in international trade 
combined with the pervasive influence on antitrust policies of international 
organizations such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) makes a comparative look at the 
treatment of competition policy by individual nations increasingly 
significant. This Article considers how four major jurisdictions delineate 
what conduct they treat strictly, what conduct is subject to a competition 
test,1 and how they treat pro-competitive conduct.2 
This Article compares four jurisdictional approaches to anticompetitive 
behavior: (1) the U.S. “rule of reason” approach,3 (2) the multifaceted 
  LL.B., BEc, BJS, Australian National University. Senior Associate, Allens Arthur Robinson, 
Melbourne, Australia. Currently on secondment to Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu, Tokyo, Japan. 
Adapted from a paper presented at the APEC Competition Policy and Economic Development 
Conference held by The Institute of Comparative Law in Japan, Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan, July 
5-9, 2001. 
 1. A competition test refers to a proscription of conduct that affects competition in some 
manner. For example, the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 prohibits agreements that substantially 
lessen competition. The Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance 
of Fair Trade prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade. 
 2. If conduct is pro-competitive, its net effect on competition is positive. For example, a joint 
venture between two competitors may reduce competition and thus lead to higher prices. However, if 
there are tremendous efficiencies resulting from the joint venture that can be passed on to consumers 
in the form of lower prices, the conduct may be pro-competitive. 
 3. The rule of reason analysis is essentially a method for determining exactly what the broad, 
sweeping words of Section 1 of the Sherman Act do not include on the grounds of reasonableness. See 
Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Historically, there have been two primary 
streams of rule of reason analysis. This Article will refer to them as (i) the “ancillary restraints” 
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flexible approach under the Treaty Establishing the European Community,4 
(3) the relatively strict Australian per se illegality approach, and (4) the less-
developed antimonopoly regime in Japan. While each of the jurisdictions 
evaluated in this Article regulates unjustifiable cartelization, the distinction 
between the regimes becomes more apparent through a thorough analysis of 
each jurisdiction’s cartelization exemptions. A comparison of the per se 
prohibitions in the antitrust regimes in Australia, the European Union, Japan 
and the United States reveals five major components of, and exemptions 
within, the antitrust analysis: strict liability, pro-competitive agreements, 
ancillary agreements, other exemptions and enforcement. 
A. Strict Liability 
Each jurisdiction treats cartels very seriously and each maintains some 
form of strict, or “per se,” liability,5 although the scope of each per se 
prohibition differs. Each jurisdiction prohibits, to a varying degree, boycott 
conduct,6 price fixing agreements,7 resale price maintenance,8 and third-line 
forcing.9 However, competition laws exclude conduct considered to be in the 
public interest from per se liability through exemptions that vary in each 
jurisdiction. In its broadest definition, the term “exemptions” includes a rule 
of reason approach in which various circumstances may be taken into 
account to allow beneficial conduct to prevail over the legislation. 
doctrine, and (ii) the “pro-competitive conduct” doctrine. In the most recent case to apply the rule of 
reason analysis, the Ninth Circuit adopted a hybrid of these two approaches. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. 
F.T.C, 224 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 4. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997) 
[hereinafter EC TREATY]. 
 5. “Per se” liability refers to conduct that is strictly illegal without any consideration of its effect 
(or lack thereof) on competition, markets, or any other relevant factors. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 6. “Boycott conduct” in antitrust law refers to agreements between competitors to limit their 
supply to a third party. This includes agreements to either allocate markets to a particular competitor(s) 
or not to supply to or acquire anything from another party. 
 7. Price fixing agreements include agreements that fix discounts, rebates, and commissions. 
 8. “Resale price maintenance” concerns the practice whereby a manufacturer or wholesaler 
either requires a retailer to sell products at or above a certain price level, or terminates the supply to a 
retailer because the retailer has discounted the price of the manufacturer’s product. 
 9. “Third-line forcing” is the practice of offering products on the condition that the customer 
simultaneously purchase the products of another supplier. For example, a bank may offer a mortgage 
on the condition that the customer obtain insurance from a certain insurance company. In such a case, 
it is likely that the bank will receive a commission from the insurance company for the referral. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol1/iss1/16
p415 Bos book pages .doc  10/15/02   2:22 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF CARTELS 417 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Agreements That Have a Pro-Competitive Effect 
In Australia and Europe, companies must complete the formal ex ante 
clearance process before the law will exempt any pro-competitive conduct. In 
the United States, however, a rule of reason approach allows courts to 
determine that the challenged conduct does not breach the Sherman Act if it 
is pro-competitive. Some commentators argue that Japan follows the 
approach of the United States,10 while others argue a similar rule of reason 
doctrine exists in both the European Union and Australia. Anticompetition 
regimes in both Japan and the United States do not provide for formal pre-
clearance of conduct. The U.S. system allows parties to engage in conduct 
that appears to be anticompetitive but that actually contains net pro-
competitive effects. This system provides businesses in the United States 
with the flexibility to continue their business practices without the 
intervention associated with the clearance processes. The drawback is that 
U.S. businesses do not have the comfort and assurance offered by the formal 
clearance systems of the European Union and Australia. 
C. Ancillary Agreements 
U.S. courts and the European Commission also follow a second rule of 
reason doctrine whereby they will determine that no breach of the antitrust 
laws has occurred with regard to otherwise anticompetitive agreements that 
are merely ancillary to a legitimate agreement. Neither U.S. nor E.U. 
legislation expressly state this practice, which has evolved entirely through 
case law. In Australia, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (T.P.A.) permits price 
agreements (but not other per se offenses) that are ancillary to formal joint 
venture arrangements, which offers a level of surety that the U.S. and E.U. 
systems do not. In comparison, the T.P.A. offers broader protection to 
legitimate joint ventures, yet offers no protection to any other competitors 
who make legitimate joint arrangements that do not qualify as joint ventures 
unless formal authorization has been obtained. The Japanese regime is still 
undeveloped with regard to ancillary restraints, but it is arguable that this is 
because the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) has ignored cases in 
the past that are not obvious examples of cartelization, thereby creating an 
informal exemption for agreements that fall short of being hardcore in nature. 
 10. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1. 
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D. Other Exemptions 
Of all four jurisdictions, the European Union maintains the greatest range 
of exemptions. In addition to exempting ancillary restraints and pro-
competitive conduct, the EC Treaty contains express exemptions for crisis 
cartels. Finally, the E.U.’s de minimis doctrine allows inconsequential 
conduct to continue unquestioned.11 The other three jurisdictions also have 
provisions for government-mandated conduct, but Japan has been reducing 
the nature of its other exemptions and, in 2000, revoked its equivalent of 
crisis cartel exemptions. In addition, the Australian T.P.A. expressly exempts 
the operations of liner cargo shipping cartels.12 All four jurisdictions 
currently possess some level of exemption for conduct related to intellectual 
property.13 
E. Vigorous Enforcement 
Despite the different approaches of the four jurisdictions, recognized 
cartels suffer a similar fate under each. Each jurisdiction views price and 
boycott cartels with suspicion and will allow the cartels to survive only in the 
rare situations where they produce considerable public benefits or are highly 
pro-competitive—both extremely rare situations. The rationale attributed to 
the different levels of approaches is the different priority that each 
jurisdiction places on price fixing conduct. Until 1970, Japan did not 
prosecute price cartels. The European Union has a “market overview” role, 
thus leaving the details to each of its member states, which results in less of a 
need for vigorous enforcement. The United States always has recognized the 
importance of antitrust laws (although Chicago School economists have been 
very influential in the last twenty years). Australia has started to treat 
competition policy more seriously since the National Competition Policy 
Review commenced in 1995. Douglas Rosenthal and Mitsuo Matsushita 
point out that “the differences between the United States, Europe, and Japan 
begin to look more like differences in degree than kind . . . when one parses 
different specific indicators of the commitment to competition.”14 
 11. The de minimis doctrine stipulates that agreements that affect less than 10% of the relevant 
market (for horizontal restraints) and less than 15% of the market (for vertical restraints) are not 
subject to the EC Treaty. See Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance Which Do Not 
Appreciably Restrict Competition Under Article 81(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (de minimis), 2001 O.J. (C 368) 7 [hereinafter Commission Notice]. 
 12. Trade Practices Act, 1974, Part X (Austl.). 
 13. Australia currently is reviewing this exemption. 
 
 14. Douglas E. Rosenthal & Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition in Japan and the West: Can the 
Approaches be Reconciled?, in GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY 318 (Edward M. Graham & J. David 
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II. LEGISLATION 
A. United States 
The United States regulates cartels in Section 1 of the Sherman Act and 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act. Both sections are broad, and as I will discuss, 
are subject to varying interpretations by U.S. courts. 
1. The Sherman Act   
Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares that “[E]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
hereby declared to be illegal.”15 
2. The Clayton Act 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the 
course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale 
of goods . . . or fix a price charged . . . where the effect of such lease, 
sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or 
understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to 
create a monopoly in any line of commerce.16 
Price fixing and boycott cases hold that unreasonable or unjustifiable 
price fixing, boycotting, or resale price maintenance that is not ancillary is 
per se illegal. The United States adopts a rule of reason approach, but does 
not have statutory exemption or authorization provisions. In addition, the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) will offer parties engaging in particular 
forms of conduct a comfort letter indicating that the DOJ does not intend to 
take action against such parties with regard to such conduct. Comfort letters 
generally contain qualifying phrases such as “in the absence of extenuating 
circumstances . . .” and do not provide protection from prosecution by private 
litigants or state regulators. 
Richardson eds., 1997). 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 16. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999)). 
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B. European Union 
1. EC Treaty 
Article 81 of the EC Treaty states:  
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common 
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect 
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other 
trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or 
investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of such contracts. 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article 
shall be automatically void. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared 
inapplicable in the case of: 
any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; 
any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings; 
any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods 
or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions 
which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; 
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(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition 
in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.17  
The EC Treaty applies only to agreements that may affect trade between 
the member states of the European Union. The EC Treaty has been 
interpreted to hold that price fixing and boycott conduct are per se illegal.18 
The E.U. system includes exemptions in the form of: (1) declarations or 
formal exemptions of particular conduct that meets the public benefit tests 
outlined in Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty; (2) a de minimis doctrine that 
mandates that inconsequential restraints (agreements that affect less than 
10% of the horizontal market and 15% of the vertical market) do not breach 
the EC Treaty; and 3) a form of rule of reason analysis, such that ancillary 
restraints do not violate the EC Treaty.19 Many parties also rely on an 
informal clearance in the form of a comfort letter from the European 
Commission, stating that particular conduct will not breach the EC Treaty 
and that the Commission will not take subsequent action against the cartel.20 
C. Australia 
1. Trade Practices Act 1974 Part IV 
a. Section 45: prohibits boycott conduct (per se illegality) and 
horizontal agreements that substantially lessen competition;21 
b. Section 45A: deems that price fixing agreements between 
competitors substantially lessen competition (per se illegality);22 
c. Section 46: prohibits misuses of market power;23 
d. Section 47: prohibits vertical agreements that substantially lessen 
competition;24 
e. Section 47(6): prohibits third-line forcing (per se illegality);25 
 17. EC Treaty art. 81, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3. 
 18. See Competition Rules Relating to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2000 O.J. (C118) 
[hereinafter Competition Rules]. 
 19. Commission Notice, 2001 O.J. (C 368) 7. 
 20. For examples of comfort letters, see COMFORT LETTERS 1999, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
competition/antitrust/closed/en/comfor99.html. 
 21. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 45 (Austl.) 
 22. Id. § 45A. 
 23. Id. § 46. 
 24. Id. § 47. 
 25. Id. § 47(6). 
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f. Section 48: prohibits resale price maintenance (per se illegality);26 
g. Section 50: prohibits mergers that substantially lessen competition. 
Price fixing, boycott conduct, third-line forcing and resale price 
maintenance are per se violations of the T.P.A. Horizontal and vertical 
agreements (other than per se offenses) and mergers violate the T.P.A. if they 
breach a competition test.27 The T.P.A. also includes an exemption from the 
price fixing prohibition of Section 45A for conduct performed pursuant to 
joint venture arrangements.28 In addition, as discussed later in further detail, 
other exemptions include conduct expressly authorized by legislation,29 
conduct engaged in by international liner cargo shipping cartels,30 and 
conduct or agreements that the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC)31 authorizes on public benefit grounds.32 
D. Japan 
1. The Antimonopoly Law of 1947 
Section 3 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private 
Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade (“Antimonopoly Law”) states that 
“[n]o entrepreneur shall effect private monopolization or [an] unreasonable 
restraint of trade.”33 Section 2(6) defines an unreasonable restraint of trade 
as: 
[S]uch business activities, by which any entrepreneur, by contract, 
agreement or any other concerted actions . . . with other entrepreneurs, 
mutually restrict or conduct their business activities in such a manner 
as to fix, maintain, or increase prices, or to limit production, 
technology, products, facilities, or customers or suppliers, thereby 
 26. Id. § 48. 
 27. Id. § 50. 
 28. See id. § 45A(2). 
 29. See id. § 51(1).  
 30. See id. Part X. 
 31. Such a decision is subject to an appeal and possible final decision by the Australian 
Competition Tribunal, a quasi-judicial body comprised of industrial, economic, and legal experts. 
 32. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 88 (Austl.). 
 33. Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi Oyobi Kosei Torihiki no Kakuho ni Kansuru Horitsu [Act 
Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade], Act No. 54 of Apr. 14, 
1947, § 3 [hereinafter Antimonopoly Law], reprinted in HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI UESUGI, THE 
ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS AND POLICIES OF JAPAN app. A, at 387 (1994). 
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causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of 
competition in any particular field of trade.34 
The relevant elements within are: 
(1) Concerted activities among enterprises that 
(2) Mutually restrict their business activities by 
(3) Fixing prices and limiting production and/or the terms of business 
(4) Which causes, contrary to the public interest,  
(5) A substantial restraint of trade in any particular field of trade. 
There is a debate as to whether Japan treats price fixing and boycott 
conduct as per se offenses.35 That there is a debate surrounding whether 
Japan would adopt a rule of reason approach as the “public interest” term in 
the Antimonopoly Law implies that Japan should take factors other than just 
competition considerations into account in applying the Antimonopoly Law.  
The Antimonopoly Law exempts particular categories of cartels that the 
JFTC authorizes under separate legislation.36 As the statutory exemptions 
continue to decrease within the competition law scheme, the JFTC is 
prepared to consider factors other than the pure effects of competition when 
examining potential breaches of Antimonopoly Law. 
III. OBJECTIVES OF THE LAWS OF EACH JURISDICTION 
Competition to increase sales or maximize profits almost invariably will 
lead to a more efficient allocation of resources, and will encourage producers 
or retailers to provide better service, quality, and value, as well as lower 
prices. Competition therefore may be an incentive for producers to research 
better technology or develop more efficient business methods. For each 
country, competitive domestic industries may advance ahead of equivalent 
 34. Id. § 2(6).  
 35. It is interesting to note that the Antimonopoly Law imposed by the occupation forces in 1947 
included strict per se illegal standards, which were relaxed in the 1953 amendments. However, Mitsuo 
Matsushita argues that, on the basis of the Petroleum Cartel cases, per se illegality can be made out in 
the current regime. MITSUO MATSUSHITA & JOHN D. DAVIS, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE 
ANTIMONOPOLY LAW 41 (1990). See also Japan v. Idemitsu Kosan, K.K., 985 Hanrei Jiho 3 (Tokyo 
High Court, Sept. 26, 1980); Japan v. Petroleum Ass’n, 983 Hanrei Jiho 22 (Tokyo High Court, Sept. 
26, 1980). 
 36. The relevant Antimonopoly Law sections and exemptions include Sections 23 (Acts Under 
Intellectual Property Rights), 24 (Acts of Cooperatives), and 24-2 (Resale Price Maintenance 
Contracts). Former Sections 24-3 and 24-4, relating to depression cartels and rationalization cartels, 
were abolished in 1999. Japan abolished Section 21 (natural monopolies) in 2000. 
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foreign industries, and the associated competitive advantages can increase 
exports and improve global recognition. A conspiracy to fix prices can 
approximate the effect of monopolization by setting prices above levels 
expected in a competitive market and it therefore is treated harshly by the 
Antimonopoly Law. Monopoly profit-level pricing does not merely transfer 
wealth from the consumer to the producer. It also has an associated 
deadweight loss because consumers purchase less than they would if the 
prices were competitive.  
Globalization considerations play a role in the goals of each jurisdiction. 
In addition to enhancing efficiency and protecting small players, a major goal 
of the EC Treaty is to create a single European market.37 In addition, each 
member state of the European Union has its own antitrust laws, which may 
politically constrain the European Commission to restrict its operations to 
purely market-wide conduct.  
Australia recently embraced the benefits of competition policy and 
strengthened its competition regime, enforcement and penalties.38 Japan also 
is increasing its enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law and has reduced the 
number of available exemptions (although a cynic might say that this is the 
result of external pressure starting with the Structural Impediments Initiative 
talks with the United States in the early 1990s). This is in line with the 
original goals of the Antimonopoly Law, including the removal of domestic 
trade barriers that stifle both new market entrants and the opening of 
distribution and supply networks in Japan. The occupying forces after World 
War II wanted to remove Japanese trade barriers to open up the Japanese 
market by allowing foreign companies to compete.  
The United States has enforced its antitrust legislation vigorously and 
consistently, but arguably has the weakest per se illegality regime of the four 
jurisdictions. This may reflect the strength of the Chicago School’s influence 
in the United States over the last twenty years, which has narrowed the scope 
of the antitrust laws. An additional factor in the erosion of the per se regime 
in the United States is the cost to U.S. courts of having to adjudicate a rule of 
reason that takes longer than simply condemning the conduct for its mere 
occurrence. A similar logic would apply to the introduction of exemption 
systems that rely on parties to notify regulators of the parties’ potentially 
 37. PAUL CRAIG & GRÀINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT CASES AND MATERIALS 892 (2d ed. 
1998).  
 38. For example, in 1994, Australia increased the maximum fines for breach of the competition 
provisions of the T.P.A. from five hundred thousand dollars to ten million dollars per offense. In 1995, 
Australia extended the reach of the T.P.A. to cover a wider range of businesses, including professional 
occupations. The ACCC’s powers have been enhanced by increases to both its investigative powers 
and ability to accept enforceable undertakings. 
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anticompetitive conduct. Such systems avoid the costs of having to both 
adjudicate all potential breaches in court and monitor industries to find 
potential breaches. 
IV. TREATMENT OF ELEMENTS OF CARTELS 
A. Per Se Basis 
Collaboration of competitors is the oldest and most notorious way to 
create or consolidate economic power. When all significant 
competitors join together to eliminate their natural rivalry on price or 
other important terms of trade, they form the most offensive of all 
devices to trump the market – the cartel . . . Price fixing deadens the 
central nervous system of competition. It creates inefficiencies. It is 
illegal [in the United States] per se.39 
Each jurisdiction treats per se offenses such as price cartels, boycotts, and 
resale price maintenance with varying degrees of strictness. However, “naked 
restraints,” or blatant price fixing agreements or cartels without pro-
competitive or efficiency justifications, would be illegal in all jurisdictions. 
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)/DOJ Antitrust Guidelines for 
Collaborations Among Competitors offers a useful explanation of the “per 
se” treatment: 
Certain types of agreements are so likely to harm competition and to 
have no significant procompetitive benefits that they do not warrant 
the time and expense required for particularized inquiry into their 
effects. Once identified, such agreements are challenged as per se 
unlawful.40  
This position applies in all four jurisdictions. The difference in the four 
jurisdictions lies in the scope of the per se illegality of an offense.  
Both the U.S. and European regimes simultaneously consider the 
competition aspects of an arrangement and the associated public benefits to 
 39. Eleanor M. Fox, Competitors’ Collaboration—A Methodology for Analysis, 5 ANTITRUST 19 
(1990).  
 40. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 3 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ 
ftcdojguidelines.pdf [hereinafter FTC/DOJ GUIDELINES]. See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) 
(stating that the anticompetitive potential inherent in all price fixing agreements justifies their facial 
invalidation even if pro-competitive justifications are offered for some). 
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determine whether the given party breached the respective antitrust 
legislation. In contrast, the Australian competition regime first looks at 
whether the competition issues lead to a breach and then separately considers 
whether any exemptions exist. The United States, Japan, and the European 
Union will allow conduct that benefits the public and justifies any 
anticompetitive effects, but in Australia, unless previously cleared, the public 
benefit of particular conduct generally is irrelevant in determining a breach of 
the T.P.A. It is debatable as to which side of the line Japan falls on. However, 
the Antimonopoly Law expressly mentions “public interest” and there may 
be cases where this will temper any per se illegality.  
Although the two concepts are not entirely distinguishable, competition 
and public benefits are considered separately in this Article. This Article does 
not specify the elements or various forms of per se offenses, but rather 
focuses on how and where regulators draw the line between what constitutes 
a per se offense and what conduct is subject to a normal competition test. 
1. United States 
Although Congress does not use the term “per se” in the U.S. legislation, 
if read literally, the legislation condemns all agreements relating to trade as 
per se illegal.41 The U.S. Supreme Court clearly indicates that hardcore and 
naked price fixing, resale price maintenance, tying, and boycotts such as 
market sharing are per se illegal.42 Although the Court warned of the evils of 
price fixing back in 1898,43 the case most often cited on this issue is United 
States v. Trenton Potteries,44 in which the District Court for the Southern 
 41. Because all agreements restrain trade in some way, all agreements appear to fall within the 
purview of the Sherman Act. However, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned this view as early as 1897. 
See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n., 166 U.S. 290 (1897). In a subsequent case, United 
States v. Joint-Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898), Justice Peckham stated that “[an] 
agreement entered into for the purpose of promoting the legitimate business of an individual or 
corporation, with no purpose to thereby affect or restrain interstate commerce, and which does not 
directly restrain such commerce, is not, as we think, covered by the Act, although the agreement may 
indirectly and remotely affect that commerce.” This reasoning forms the basis of the rule of reason 
approach. See generally PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 637-42 (1978 & Supp. 1986) 
(discussing the history and background of the rule of reason and per se approaches in the United 
States). 
 42. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977); F.T.C. v. Superior 
Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 432-36 (1990). See also FTC/DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 
40, at 8. 
 43. See Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). 
 44. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), cited with approval in United 
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150, 212 (1940). “[T]his Court sustained a 
conviction under the Sherman Act where the jury was charged that an agreement on the part of the 
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District of New York instructed the jury to ignore the reasonableness of both 
the prices and good intentions of the combining units. The Court stated that: 
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the 
elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, 
whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the 
market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices . . . Agreements 
which create such potential power may well be held to be in 
themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity 
of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or 
unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the government . . . the 
burden of ascertaining . . . whether it has become unreasonable . . .45 
However, the extent of the development of the rule of reason approach 
raises questions as to whether there is in fact a per se illegality doctrine in the 
United States. While all price fixing is per se illegal in Australia, price fixing 
is only per se illegal in the United States if it is unreasonable. Based on this 
apparent inconsistency, Robert Bork argued that per se illegality does not 
exist in the United States, stating that “[t]he persistent refusal of courts to 
honor the literal terms of the per se rules against price-fixing . . . 
demonstrates a deep-seated though somewhat inarticulate sense that those 
rules, as usually stated, are inadequate.”46 U.S. courts do not clearly 
distinguish the per se and rule of reason analyses as the other three 
jurisdictions do. 
2. European Union 
The words of the EC Treaty do not explicitly state that any of the offenses 
listed in Article 81(1) are per se offenses, and in fact do not apply to 
agreements that do not affect trade between E.U. member states. A mere 
limitation on competition between parties is insufficient to constitute a 
members of a combination, controlling a substantial part of an industry, upon the prices which the 
members are to charge for their commodity is in itself an unreasonable restraint of trade without regard 
to the reasonableness of the prices or the good intentions of the combining units.” Id. 
 45. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. at 397. Modern case law has also made it clear that boycotts and 
price fixing are per se illegal. Cont’l T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 50 n.16, cited in James T. Halverson, The 
Future of Horizontal Restraints Analysis, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 33, 35 (1988). 
 46. Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market 
Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 777 (1965). See also Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 
792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), in which Judge Bork implies that the per se concept does not exist. 
Martin Louis considers this to be the case, at least with regard to trademarks. Martin B. Louis, 
Restraints Ancillary to Joint Ventures and Licensing Agreements: Do Sealy and Topco Logically 
Survive Sylvania and Broadcast Music? 66 VA. L. REV. 879 (1980). 
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breach. However, in effect, the EC Treaty treats price fixing and boycott 
conduct more strictly. The European Commission’s Guidelines on the 
Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty state: 
In some cases the nature of a cooperation indicates from the outset the 
applicability of Article 81(1). This is the case for agreements that have 
as their object a restriction of competition by means of price fixing, 
output limitation or sharing of markets or customers. These 
agreements are presumed to have negative market effects. It is 
therefore not necessary to examine their actual effects on competition 
and the market in order to establish that they fall within Article 
81(1).47 
3. Australia 
In Australia, the basis of the per se nature of the price fixing offense is 
legislative. Section 45A of the T.P.A. deems that any agreement that has 
either the purpose or effect of fixing, controlling, or maintaining prices is a 
breach of the proscription against agreements that substantially lessen 
competition.48 Boycott conduct (Section 45), resale price maintenance 
(Section 48), and third-line forcing (Section 47(6)) are all per se illegal under 
the T.P.A. However, as in the United States, debate arises as to both how far 
these prohibitions extend and what conduct constitutes an offense in violation 
of the T.P.A. For example, the language of the price fixing legislation in 
Section 45A indicates that there must be more than just an agreement as to 
prices. The standard in that section requires fixing, controlling, or 
maintenance of such prices.49 Boycott conduct is only offensive if the 
purpose of the conduct is anticompetitive, regardless of the actual effect. 
4. Japan 
To date, the JFTC has aimed its enforcement at clear-cut price fixing 
where there is no question that the conduct unreasonably restrained trade and 
nobody has questioned the existence of per se liability. The words of the 
Antimonopoly Law do not imply that per se liability exists, but Mitsuo 
 47. Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Horizontal Cooperation 
Agreements, 2001 O.J. (C3) 2, ¶ 17 [hereinafter Horizontal Guidelines]. See also The Quinine Cartel 
Cases (Case 41/69, ACF Chemieforma NV v. Comm’n, 1970 E.C.R. 661; Case 44/69, Buchler v. 
Comm’n, 1970 E.C.R. 733; and Case 45/69, Boehringer Mannheim v. Comm’n, 1980 E.C.R. 769). 
 48. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 45A (Austl.). 
 49. Id. 
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Matsushita argues that price fixing is in fact per se illegal, despite the clear 
words of the Antimonopoly Law requiring an unreasonable restraint of 
trade.50 Hiroshi Iyori and Akinori Uesugi support this view and state that, 
with regard to cartels that fall under Section 3 of the Antimonopoly Law, 
“alleged conducts are objectionable in themselves because cartel agreements 
or acts to exclude or control other entrepreneurs are involved.”51 The JFTC 
argues that an “unreasonable restraint of trade” is synonymous with the word 
“cartel” and therefore the Antimonopoly Law prohibits all cartels.52 In 
addition, the JFTC argues that the Antimonopoly Law implicitly states that, 
as soon as firms form a cartel agreement, there is an unreasonable restraint of 
competition. 
5. A Comparison of Per Se Approaches in Each Jurisdiction 
The major difference between jurisdiction and approaches is evident in 
the flexible approach that the U.S., E.U., and Japanese legislation provide to 
regulators, which is in contrast to the strict per se rules in the Australian 
T.P.A. While the U.S. DOJ and the European Commission debate whether 
particular conduct falls outside the reach of the per se liability criteria, 
Australian courts take a stricter view and do not allow per se illegal conduct 
to escape the reach of the T.P.A. unless other legislation expressly exempts 
such conduct. All jurisdictions allow some conduct that otherwise may fall 
under the price fixing prohibitions; however, the method of determining this 
varies between jurisdictions. These differences are evident in the way that 
each jurisdiction adopts public benefit and efficiency considerations and 
treats ancillary restraints and systems for other exemptions. In particular, 
different results arise based on each regulatory agency’s different level of 
enthusiasm to prosecute in accordance with the goals of its country’s antitrust 
legislation. 
B. Consideration of Public Benefits and Efficiency 
Antitrust laws involve human interference with market processes. The 
associated risk of human error may lead to a sub-optimal result if a 
misjudged regulation exacerbates any problems associated with the particular 
market failure that the regulation attempts to correct. Accordingly, it is 
 50. See MATSUSHITA & DAVIS, supra note 35, at 41. 
 51. IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 33, at 71. 
 52. Mitsuo Matsushita, The Antimonopoly Law of Japan, in GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY, 
supra note 14, at 170-72. 
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important that antitrust laws are as unobtrusive as possible and do not impact 
market transactions that ultimately will lead to public benefits. The 
consideration of whether an agreement results in public benefits to the extent 
that the public interest should allow such an agreement to stand is of great 
importance in all four jurisdictions, although the treatment varies in each. 
Australia and the European Union maintain formal exemption, or “pre-
clearance,” systems. Australia’s “authorisation”53 system requires a decision 
from the ACCC prior to engaging in particular conduct that is otherwise at 
risk of breaching the T.P.A. The E.U. “declaration”54 system requires pre-
notification of such conduct. After notifying the European Commission of 
particular conduct, the parties may engage in the conduct until the 
Commission issues a decision. From that point on, the parties must follow 
the instructions of the Commission’s decision. The authorization and 
declaration systems do not apply retrospectively. Any conduct parties engage 
in prior to the grant of an exemption in Australia or lodgment of notification 
in the European Union is a breach, regardless of whether the grant or 
notification would exempt the same conduct. In the United States, such 
conduct is likely to escape prosecution under the rule of reason approach. 
There are several differences between the Australian and European pre-
clearance systems. The Australian “authorisation” system is valid only with 
respect to those named in the application, whereas the European exemptions 
may apply to a particular type of industry or conduct. Examples of the 
European exemptions include the new exemptions for all horizontal or 
vertical restraints that meet certain criteria (e.g. a market share of less than 
30%) and the recent exemption for all motor vehicle distribution agreements, 
subject to certain conditions. Only after the ACCC grants authorization does 
it become valid. In contrast, a “declaration” issued by the European 
Commission provides an exemption from the time the parties notify the 
Commission until the Commission issues its decision. The European system 
allows for the Commission to issue decisions quickly if necessary, whereas 
the Australian authorization process has no streamlining mechanism in place. 
Both systems are transparent and allow public consultation and commentary 
as well as draft decisions and appeals to higher authorities.  
In contrast to these ex ante systems, the United States adopts a rule of 
reason approach by which the FTC considers the public benefits arising from 
 53. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 88 (Austl.). Note that the Trade Practices Act also allows 
notification, a less onerous process, for exclusive dealing. Id. § 93. 
 54. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 81(3). It is also appropriate in some circumstances to obtain an 
“informal” clearance from Directorate-General IV (DGIV) to the effect that particular conduct does 
not breach the EC Treaty. 
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particular conduct in determining whether a breach has occurred. The U.S. 
system does not allow for prior clearance of conduct, but it takes into account 
similar factors when considering whether a breach has occurred. In Australia 
there is a strict delineation of the competition analysis and the consideration 
of the public benefits in relation to certain conduct. In stark contrast, the 
United States expressly considers the public benefits in determining whether 
the particular offense fits within its antitrust laws. 
1. U.S. Consideration of Public Benefit: Rule of Reason Approach 
“Rule of reason” is the term given to the approach adopted by U.S. courts 
in which they take public benefits or other relevant considerations into 
account when determining whether particular conduct breaches the broad test 
of the Sherman Act, which states that “every combination . . . in restraint of 
trade . . . is illegal.”55 The rule of reason approach is a method for determining 
exactly what is not included, on the grounds of reasonableness, in this broad, 
sweeping test. The discussion in this section focuses on the rule of reason 
approach as it relates to pro-competitive conduct and ancillary restraints, as 
well as the hybrid approach. 
The pro-competitive conduct doctrine of the rule of reason analysis in the 
United States originated in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Board of 
Trade of Chicago v. United States.56 Justice Brandeis stated that: 
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. 
To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is 
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps 
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or 
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must 
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the 
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was 
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. 
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for 
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be 
attained, are all relevant facts.57 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2001). 
 56. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
 57. Id. at 238 (emphasis added). 
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The FTC/DOJ Guidelines adopt this reasoning: 
If, however, participants in an efficiency-enhancing integration of 
economic activity enter into an agreement that is reasonably related to 
the integration and reasonably necessary to achieve its procompetitive 
benefits, the Agencies analyze the agreement under the rule of reason, 
even if it is of a type that might otherwise be considered per se 
illegal.58 
Essentially, the pro-competitive conduct doctrine involves U.S. courts 
making a full market analysis to determine whether the questioned conduct 
creates public benefits, efficiencies, or a pro-competitive result that should 
allow the conduct to stand. The court applied this approach as recently as 
1982 in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society.59 However, there has 
been some debate as to whether this approach is correct, and the courts have 
had problems reconciling this approach with the ancillary restraints doctrine 
and the strict per se approach.60 The confusion of U.S. courts with regard to 
the interaction of the three approaches arguably arises as a result of 
traditional attempts to treat them as being mutually exclusive. In contrast, the 
European Union and Australia separate consideration of the competition into 
an initial step and then examine other elements such as public benefits arising 
from such conduct in a separate step. However, the recent U.S. Supreme 
Court and Ninth Circuit decisions in California Dental Association v. 
Federal Trade Commission61 may create a hybrid approach that rationalizes 
the coexistence of all three doctrines. 
Arguments exist that one can find an approach similar to that of the 
United States in Australia and the European Union outside the formal 
clearance procedures, and that Japan also is adopting a rule of reason 
approach similar to that in the United States. 
 58. FTC/DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 40, at 8. 
 59. 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
 60. Despite the contrast with Maricopa, which reinforced the Australian style of strict and broad-
reaching per se liability for price fixing, the Supreme Court’s view in United States v. Topco 
Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), that there is room for consideration of pro-competitive or 
efficiency considerations in determining whether conduct falls within the per se realm appears to 
prevail.  
 61. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 128 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated by 526 U.S. 756 (1999), 
remanded to 224 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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2. Japan 
The JFTC and many commentators take the conservative view that the 
term “public interest” in the Antimonopoly Law is synonymous with a 
“restraint of competition,” and therefore any agreement in restraint of 
competition goes against the public interest and thus renders the words of the 
Antimonopoly Law virtually irrelevant. While this view is somewhat popular 
in Japan, recently the basis for a move to a more flexible approach has 
emerged and the JFTC has relaxed its stance to adapt to the fact that Japan 
has abolished many of the previous statutory exemptions that covered 
conduct that benefited the public. There are some indications that in the 
future Japan may follow the U.S. pro-competitive conduct doctrine because 
modern Japanese decisions such as the Petroleum Cartel cases62 have hinted 
that there may be room for the exemption of agreements that are pro-
competitive.63 The Petroleum Cartel court held that the term “public interest” 
generally refers to free trade, but it made the available exemption very 
narrow. This view is gaining more support in light of the JFTC’s attitude 
toward relaxing its strict policy of ignoring public benefit issues. Certainly, 
the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations, the Keidanren, argues 
that “public interest” is much broader than the term “restraint of competition” 
and includes a variety of factors such as consumer interest and the Japanese 
economy’s growth and stability.64 In other words, “substantial restraints of 
trade” are generally illegal, but the JFTC may exempt them if they are 
necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose that outweighs the advantage of 
maintaining competition.65 
The Keidanren’s view of “public interest” has merit given the fact that the 
words expressly exist in the Antimonopoly Law. If considered in light of the 
treatment and common understanding of that term in the other three 
jurisdictions, it parallels the Australian and E.U. considerations of these 
words used in the formal clearance systems, as well as the U.S. adoption of 
the term in the rule of reason consideration. In fact, in the United States, the 
European Union, and Australia the concept of “public interest” is virtually 
unlimited and can include efficiency, industry rationalization, increased 
employment opportunities, increased exports, and environmental issues.66 
 62. Japan v. Idemitsu Kosan, K.K., 985 Hanrei Jiho 3 (Tokyo High Court, Sept. 26, 1980); Japan 
v. Petroleum Ass’n, 983 Hanrei Jiho 22 (Tokyo High Court, Sept. 26, 1980). 
 63. See CCH INT’L, JAPAN BUS. L. GUIDE para. 32,004 (1993). 
 64. Matsushita, supra note 52, at 172. 
 65. MITSUO MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW IN JAPAN 96-98 
(1993). 
 66. See AUSTL. COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMM’N, GUIDE TO AUTHORISATIONS AND 
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However, a very high level of public benefit is necessary to justify price 
fixing agreements in all three of these jurisdictions, although there are 
examples of such in each jurisdiction.   
In addition, it appears that there is room for a rule of reason argument if 
one examines the words of the Antimonopoly Law closely. The words of the 
Antimonopoly Law, which makes only “undue” offenses illegal, seem to 
imply a reasonableness requirement. However, the JFTC likely will argue 
that any substantial restraint of competition will be either unreasonable or 
undue, thereby removing this avenue for reasonableness analysis. This 
argument raises the question of why the word “undue” was included in the 
Antimonopoly Law in the first place. 
3. A Pro-Competitive Conduct Rule of Reason in the European Union? 
In addition to considering public benefits through the declaration process 
specified in the EC Treaty, Paul Craig and Gràinne de Búrca argue that while 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has not employed the language of the 
rule of reason, there is evidence of a balancing of the pro- and 
anticompetitive effects of an agreement in its judgment,67 although it appears 
that the ECJ does not always share the enthusiasm of U.S. courts. In Societe 
Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH68 and L.C. Nungesser KG 
& Kurt Eisele v. E.C. Commission,69 the ECJ found that the coordinated 
actions of competitors did not breach the EC Treaty due to the net pro-
competitive effects of the conduct. However, the ECJ did not expressly 
attribute its decision to this reasoning nor acknowledge that it was adopting a 
rule of reason approach. 
4. A Pro-Competitive Conduct Rule of Reason in Australia? 
Despite the common assumption that Australia does not adopt the pro-
competitive conduct rule of reason, and even though only minimal judicial 
consideration of T.P.A. Section 45A exists, there are cases and commentary 
that one may characterize as a form of rule of reason analysis. Stephen 
Corones comments that: 
NOTIFICATIONS 19-21 (1995), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/pubs/Publications/Business_ 
general/AuthNotif/Authguid.pdf (providing a list of recognized public benefits). 
 67. CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 37, at 913. 
 68. Societe Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, Case 56/65, [1966] E.C.R. 235, 
[1966] 5 C.M.L.R. 357.  
 69. L.C. Nungesser KG & Kurt Eisele v. E.C. Comm’n, Case 258/78, [1982] E.C.R. 2015, 
[1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 278.  
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In Australia the courts apply a truncated rule of reason rather than a 
comprehensive rule of reason. The Australian rule of reason is 
confined to measuring the effect of conduct on competition in a 
market on a “with and without” basis. They do not take into account 
whether the conduct gives rise to production efficiencies and attempt 
to balance those cost savings against the consumer welfare loss 
associated with the lessening of competition. Such a comprehensive 
rule of reason analysis is conducted in Australia by the Commission 
and the Tribunal pursuant to the authorisation process.70 
However, it is arguable that the Australian regime goes further than just 
comparing the level of competition that would exist in the absence of an 
agreement with the level of competition if the ACCC allows the agreement to 
proceed. There are three sources of evidence for this assertion. 
First, in some monopolization (or to use the term in the T.P.A., “misuse 
of market power”) cases, courts considered efficiency as a justification for 
particular monopolistic conduct.71 The ACCC itself has asserted that it will 
take efficiency considerations into account in some cases. For example, it 
will consider efficiency when considering whether a merger will lessen 
competition substantially.72 
Second, Australian scholars have read a rule of reason type approach into 
the words of the highly regarded Justice Lockhart in Radio 2UE Sydney Pty. 
Ltd v. Stereo FM Pty. Ltd.73 In Radio 2UE Sydney, Lockhart hinted at the 
existence of a “pro-competitive conduct rule of reason” with the following 
statement: “Nor in my view was s. 45A introduced by Parliament to make 
arrangements unlawful which affect price by improving competition.”74 
Justice Lockhart did not take this reasoning any further, but it is apparent that 
he ultimately decided the case along the lines of an ancillary restraints-style 
rule of reason doctrine. 
Third, although not directly related to the pro-competitive conduct rule of 
reason doctrine, one important role of the U.S. and E.U. rule of reason 
analysis is to exclude conduct that should be covered by the per se 
 70. STEPHEN CORONES, COMPETITION LAW IN AUSTRALIA 45 (2d ed. 1999). 
 71. See Melway Publishing Pty. Ltd. v. Robert Hicks Pty. Ltd. [2001] HCA 13 (Austl.). See also 
Frances Hanks & Philip Williams, Implications of the Decision of the High Court in Queensland Wire, 
17 MELB. U. L. REV. 437, 446 (1990) (describing the fact that the High Court “explained [Section 46 
of the Trade Practices Act] in a way that corresponds quite closely to the interpretation given by courts 
in the United States to s. 2 of the Sherman Act” over the last decade). 
 72. See AUSTL. COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMM’N, MERGER GUIDELINES ¶¶ 5.171-5.174 
(1999). 
 73. Radio 2UE Sydney Pty. Ltd. v. Stereo FM Pty. Ltd. (1982) 44 A.L.R. 557.  
 74. Id.  
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exemption. In this regard, some parallels can be seen in two Australian cases, 
Radio 2UE Sydney75 and Trade Parties Commission v. Service Station 
Association Ltd.76 For a breach to occur, the T.P.A. requires a “fixing, 
controlling or maintaining” of prices, rather than merely a discussion about 
prices.  
On appeal, in confirming Justice Lockhart’s judgment in Radio 2UE 
Sydney, the Full Federal Court stated that: 
In our view the word “fixing” in s. 45A takes colour from its general 
context and from the words used with it – “controlling or maintaining” 
and not every determination of a price, following discussion between 
competitors, will amount to a price “fixing”. There must, we believe, 
be an element of intention or likelihood to affect price competition 
before price “fixing” can be established . . . 
 When two or more competitors agree to sell a joint package of 
goods or services, at a price agreed between them, in addition to the 
goods or services which they ordinarily sell in competition with each 
other and with others, the necessary provision for arriving at a price 
for those goods or services is not, in our opinion, a provision for 
fixing, controlling or maintaining prices within the meaning of s. 45A. 
This is certainly true in those cases where the individual competitors 
are entirely free to fix the price of their ingredient of the package and 
to change it at any time. We believe that proposition would still be 
correct without that proviso, but we do not need to reach a concluded 
opinion on that point in this case.77 
The Full Federal Court’s logic shows a parallel with the U.S. rule of 
reason approach of using rule of reason analysis as a definitional tool to 
delineate where the line between per se illegality and acceptable conduct lies. 
It is simplistic to consider the words “per se” and therefore consider that all 
price agreements are prohibited, but a closer examination of the T.P.A. 
reveals a requirement that the agreement go further than a mere price 
discussion. The T.P.A. requires that there be an agreement to fix, control, or 
maintain prices.  
Australian courts have not considered this issue since Radio 2UE 
Sydney.78 It remains to be seen whether Australian courts will choose to 
 75. Id.  
 76. Trade Parties Comm’n v. Service Station Ass’n Ltd. (1993) 116 A.L.R. 643. 
 77. Radio 2UE Sydney Pty. Ltd. v. Stereo FM Pty. Ltd. (1983) 48 A.L.R. 361. 
 78. The Federal Court of Australia considered Section 45 of the Trade Practices Act again most 
recently in Austl. Competition and Consumer Comm’n v. CC (NSW) Pty. Ltd., (1999) 92 F.C.R. 375. 
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follow the lead provided in Radio 2UE Sydney in analyzing price fixing 
conduct with a rule of reason approach, or whether they will revert to 
following the strict words of the T.P.A. 
C. Consideration of Ancillary Restraints 
Ancillary restraints are small and inconsequential agreements that are a 
necessary part of a larger scheme. The jurisdictions all appear to recognize at 
some level that if agreements assist in reaching a worthier goal, the 
jurisdictions should not treat them as per se offenses. 
1. United States 
In United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,79 Judge Taft used a two-
step approach to determine whether the conduct of all the parties involved 
amounted to a restraint of trade in breach of section 1 of the Sherman Act. He 
first asked whether the essential purpose of the contract was legitimate and 
pro-competitive.80 If not, he said, the rule of per se illegality applied because 
the contract was a naked restraint.81 However, if the main purpose was 
legitimate and the restraint was necessary, but an ancillary measure was 
necessary to give effect to the main purpose, then the ancillary restraint 
would not be a breach if it were no wider than necessary to give effect to the 
main purpose.82 
In Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Judge Bork said: 
To be ancillary, and hence exempt from the per se rule, an agreement 
eliminating competition must be subordinate and collateral to a 
separate, legitimate transaction. The ancillary restraint is subordinate 
and collateral in the sense that it serves to make the main transaction 
more effective in accomplishing its purpose. Of course, the restraint 
imposed must be related to the efficiency sought to be achieved. If it is 
so broad that part of the restraint suppresses competition without 
creating efficiency, the restraint is, to that extent, not ancillary. Taft [in 
However, in that case, Justice Lindgren noted that the Full Federal Court did not have to consider the 
issue of whether Justice Lockhart was correct in stating that a price fixing arrangement with a net 
advantageous effect on competition would not constitute a contravention of the price fixing provision. 
Lindgren’s commentary on Radio 2UE Sydney merely repeated the words of the legislation, which also 
state that any agreement that controls prices is an offense regardless of its effect on competition.  
 79. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). 
 80. Id. at 282. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 282-83. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p415 Bos book pages .doc  10/15/02   2:22 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
438   WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 1:415 
 
 
 
 
 
Addyston Pipe] added the further obvious qualification that even 
restraints ancillary in form are illegal if they are part of a general plan 
to gain monopoly control of a market.83 
The U.S. legislative prohibitions are subject to the principle in Maricopa84 
that does not allow an ancillary restraint to stand if it is not a necessary part 
of the transaction, or if there is a less restrictive manner by which the parties 
can obtain the same result. The ancillary restraints rule of reason doctrine 
also is known as the “quick look” approach, reflecting the fact that the courts 
do not have to engage in the full market analysis involved in determining 
whether particular conduct possesses the net public benefits used in the pro-
competitive conduct rule of reason doctrine. 
2. Australia  
In Radio 2UE Sydney, Justice Lockhart adopted reasoning analogous to 
the ancillary restraints rule of reason doctrine to determine that a price 
agreement between two radio stations selling a joint advertising package did 
not violate Section 45A of the T.P.A. He stated: 
My approach to the construction and operation of s. 45A is generally 
in accord with the approach taken by the courts of the United States of 
America in decisions under the Sherman Act. They reflect the concern 
of those courts to carefully consider the relevant conduct before 
characterizing it as an arrangement in restraint of price competition 
and they distinguish between arrangements which directly or 
indirectly restrain price competition and those which merely 
incidentally affect it.85 
Many critics have argued that Lockhart’s judgment was incorrect because it 
ignored the fact that the T.P.A. makes any price fixing a per se offense, 
regardless of whether it is an ancillary or primary purpose of the agreement.86  
It is interesting to note that Section 45A(2) of the T.P.A. contains an 
express exemption for joint venture agreements that allows price agreements 
between competitors relating to their joint venture operations.87 However, the 
ACCC still will scrutinize the joint venture and the agreement to determine 
 83. 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 84. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
 85. Radio 2UE Sydney Pty. Ltd. v. Stereo FM Pty. Ltd. (1982) 44 A.L.R. 557 (citations omitted). 
 86. See Leonard S. Vary, Price Fixing: Flawed Past, Uncertain Future, 3 TRADE PRACTICES L.J. 
126, 130-31 (1995). 
 87. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 45A(2) (Austl.). 
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whether the arrangement substantially lessens competition. Accordingly, in 
Australia, competitors are able to set prices for their joint product. However, 
the ACCC’s test is less strict than the per se test for agreements that fix 
prices. Of course, the T.P.A. does not extend the price fixing exemption to 
activities of the joint venture parties that they conduct individually when they 
are in competition with each other. There is no requirement that parties pre-
notify the ACCC in such a case, and although a declaration that particular 
conduct is exempted is available from the court,88 parties usually rely on the 
Section 45A(2) exemption without such confirmation. Thus, for clear-cut 
cases, the result of a challenge to a restraint ancillary to a joint venture in 
Australia would be similar to that in the United States, the European Union, 
and Japan. 
3. European Union 
The European Union adopts a similar logic to the U.S. ancillary restraints 
doctrine. The European Commission’s Competition Rules Relating to 
Horizontal Cooperation Agreements state that: 
[C]ooperation agreements that have the object to restrict competition 
by means of price-fixing, output-limitation or sharing of markets or 
customers . . . are considered to be the most harmful, because they 
directly interfere with the outcome of the competitive process. Price 
fixing and output-limitation directly lead to customers paying higher 
prices or not receiving the desired quantities . . . They are therefore 
almost always prohibited.  
 This does, however, not apply if such a provision is necessary for 
the functioning of an otherwise non-restrictive or exemptable 
agreement.89 
This statement reflects the reasoning of the ECJ in Remia BV and 
Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia BV v. Commission90 and Pronuptia de Paris 
GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis,91 which commentators 
have explained as allowing pricing agreements on the grounds that the 
 88. Id. § 163A. 
 89. Competition Rules, supra note 18, ¶¶ 24-25. 
 90. Case 42/84, Remia BV & Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia BV v. Comm’n, [1985] E.C.R. 2545, 
[1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 1.  
 91. Case 161/84, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis, [1986] 
E.C.R. 353, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 414. 
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restrictions were objectively necessary for the success of the otherwise 
legitimate agreements.92 
The European Commission policy with regard to joint ventures mirrors 
the exemption in Section 45A(2) of the T.P.A., including the fact that the 
European Commission will consider joint venture arrangements with regard 
to their effect on competition, rather than providing the strict per se treatment 
for price agreements made in isolation. Although not expressly stated in the 
EC Treaty, the European Commission’s Horizontal Guidelines state that the 
per se characterization of price fixing agreements does not apply if the price 
fixing provision is necessarily an otherwise non-restrictive or exemptable 
agreement. Discussing production joint ventures, the European Commission 
stated that: 
It is inherent to the functioning of such a joint venture that decisions 
on output and prices are taken jointly by the parties . . . In this case, 
the inclusion of provisions on prices or output does not automatically 
cause the agreement to fall under Article 81(1). The provisions on 
prices or output will have to be assessed together with the other effects 
of the joint venture on the market [following the framework described 
in the Competition Rules] to determine the applicability of Article 
81(1).93 
In Re Finnish Paper Mills Association, the European Commission issued a 
notice stating that it did not intend to take action against the joint sales 
organization because there was no appreciable effect on trade between E.U. 
member states.94 
4. Japan 
The Japanese policy for dealing with ancillary restraints presently is 
unclear, notwithstanding the fact that the JFTC has prosecuted only hardcore 
cartels. The Antimonopoly Law expressly exempts agreements created by 
trade associations,95 but this exemption does not extend to the setting of 
prices. 
 92. CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 37, at 913-14. 
 93. Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 47, ¶ 25 n.18. 
 94. Re Finnish Paper Mills Ass’n, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 413. 
 95. See Antimonopoly Law § 24. 
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D. The “Hybrid” Rule of Reason Approach in the United States 
The pro-competitive conduct and ancillary restraints rule of reason 
doctrines have caused confusion in U.S. courts, which seemingly cannot 
decide whether to apply one of these two doctrines or, as the U.S. Supreme 
Court did in Maricopa, revert back to a strict per se analysis.96 The latest rule 
of reason case in the United States, California Dental Association v. Federal 
Trade Commission, attempted to unify the approaches, and many consider it 
to be the approach that courts will adopt in the future.97 
California Dental requires the use of a “sliding scale” approach, with 
reference to the “circumstances, details and logic of a restraint,”98 to 
determine whether to adopt an abbreviated rule of reason analysis (the 
ancillary restraints doctrine) or a full market analysis to determine the 
existence of pro-competitive results. The Ninth Circuit held on remand that: 
The rule-of-reason analysis consists of three components: (1) the 
persons or entities to the agreement intend to harm or restrain 
competition; (2) an actual injury to competition occurs; and (3) the 
restraint is unreasonable as determined by balancing the restraint and 
any justifications or pro-competitive effects of the restraint.99 
Edward Brunet summarizes how courts now use the two per se rules in 
the United States, a view that appears to be consistent with California 
Dental: 
The Court’s shift to economic analysis of a restraint now authorizes a 
threshold examination or quick look at an alleged restraint. If the 
restraint is clearly anticompetitive, a per se approach is appropriate. 
Conversely, if the restraint appears necessary to achieve a 
procompetitive result, then a more complete rule of reason inquiry is 
in order. Although sometimes citing the cumbersome balancing 
approach to the rule of reason, the Court, in fact, seems to be using the 
old Addyston Pipe doctrine of ancillary restraints. A rule of reason trial 
now focuses on whether the alleged restraint was an essential or 
necessary feature to a procompetitive plan. In short, the rule of reason 
trial is quite similar to the facial examination. Each emphasizes 
 96. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
 97. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 128 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated by 526 U.S. 756 (1999), 
remanded to 224 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 98. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1999). 
 99. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 224 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting American Ad Mgmt. v. GTE 
Corp., 92 F.3d 781, 789 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
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competitive impact and each seeks a restraint no more broadly 
anticompetitive than necessary.100 
This uniform approach provides the option of looking at both ancillary 
restraints and the pro-competitive effects to determine whether the conduct 
should be subject to per se liability. Hence, it brings U.S. antitrust law further 
in line with the approach of the European Union (and in a limited way, 
Australia), as it allows for the coexistence of all three doctrines. If an 
agreement is merely an ancillary restraint, or if it results in a net pro-
competitive effect and there is no other way to produce such a result, there is 
no reason to exclude the consideration of either doctrine. 
The distinction established in this Article between the ancillary restraints 
and pro-competitive conduct doctrines is somewhat artificial because U.S. 
courts often will consider that a pro-competitive ancillary restraint is easily 
justified and therefore may consider them together. However, until now, 
courts have adopted either one doctrine or the other but have been unable to 
reconcile the two, thereby causing confusion. However, the outlook for the 
rule of reason approach in the United States is positive in light of California 
Dental. 
V. EVALUATION OF THE VARIOUS APPROACHES TO PRO-COMPETITIVE 
CONDUCT AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS 
The pro-competitive conduct rule of reason doctrine in the United States 
and Japan is similar to the Australian authorization and European declaration 
processes in its consideration of whether one can justify particular conduct 
either on the grounds of the net pro-competitive effect or because such 
conduct provides an efficient outcome for the community when one 
considers it in its entirety. The primary difference is that the Australian and 
European pre-clearance systems require formal applications before parties 
may engage in particular conduct, while the U.S. and Japanese systems 
consider conduct only after its actual occurrence.  
There are obvious advantages that the Australian and European pre-
clearance systems provide. From a national perspective, it is less costly to 
administer a formal pre-clearance system than to persistently challenge 
conduct in courts of law. In addition, companies seeking to engage in 
conduct that is either pro-competitive or efficient for the economy as a 
 100. Edward Brunet, Streamlining Antitrust Litigation by “Facial Examination” of Restraints: 
The Burger Court and the Per Se-Rule of Reason Distinction, 60 WASH. L. REV. 1, 27 (1984) 
(emphasis added). 
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whole, but that risks breaching competition legislation, can rest easy knowing 
that once they have pre-clearance the competition legislation protects their 
conduct. The drawback of the rule of reason consideration of public benefits 
is that parties do not have the security to engage in particular conduct, as they 
cannot second guess whether the government or a court will consider their 
conduct to fall within the safe zone.  
However, there are also many drawbacks to pre-clearance systems. The 
pre-clearance process is public, expensive, and very time consuming. In 
Australia the authorization process generally takes at least six months, and it 
can take more than two years for the ACCC to issue a final decision.101 The 
European Commission clearance decision in Re Finnish Paper Mills 
Association102 took eight years, and the granting of an exemption in Re 
United International Pictures took seven.103 This is more of a problem in 
Australia than the European Union because authorization is not valid until 
the ACCC makes its final decision. In the European Union, the parties to the 
agreement are able to engage in the conduct from the time that they notify the 
European Commission until the European Commission makes its decision, 
thus placing a longer decision period in the applicant’s favor. Nonetheless, 
applicants will not want to make major investment decisions that the 
European Commission ultimately may reverse if it decides not to grant an 
exemption or clearance. 
The public nature of the pre-clearance process, including the fact that it 
both involves providing the jurisdictional regulator with intimate details of 
the applicant’s business operations and allows competitors, customers and 
relevant industry bodies to provide information, deters businesses from using 
the process. Often the regulator can impose, as a pre-condition to the grant of 
authorization or an exemption, conditions that are not directly related to the 
immediate conduct. The burden of dealing with the regulator can be quite 
high because the applicant often must prove its case to not only the regulator 
but to an appellate body as well. In addition, the legal fees vastly overshadow 
the authorization application fees of approximately US$4,000.  
Given the justification for both having a flexible approach to the 
regulation of agreements that may have public benefits and allowing 
exemptions to strict regulations such as per se illegal price fixing provisions, 
 101. For an example of the lengthy authorisation determination process, see AUSTL. COMPETITION 
& CONSUMER COMM’N, APPLICATION FOR AUTHORISATION: CSR LIMITED A50016 (1997), available 
at http://www.accc.gov.au/pubreg/s89_95/DOCS/a50016.pdf (showing how CSR Ltd. lodged its 
Application for Authorisation with the ACCC in August 1995, but did not receive an Authorisation 
Determination until October 1997). 
 102. Re Finnish Paper Mills Ass’n, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 413.  
 103. Re United International Pictures, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 749. 
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it seems logical to have at least some recognition of agreements that lead to 
net public benefits. Japan, despite inclusion of the term “public interest” in 
the Antimonopoly Law, appears to be the only jurisdiction without an 
established system for recognizing such public benefits. Accordingly, Japan 
would benefit from following the Keidanren view that the Antimonopoly 
Law may exempt “substantial restraints of trade” if they serve a legitimate 
social purpose, which reflects the U.S. rule of reason approach. If Japan 
follows the U.S. approach, it will be useful for Japan to have the benefit of 
hindsight of the confusion experienced by the United States, and 
consequently to adopt a hybrid method similar to the European approach 
where the three elements of the rule of reason doctrine—per se illegality, 
treatment of public benefits, and treatment of ancillary restraints—can 
coexist. 
Although the European Union, Australia, and the United States legally 
allow for some acceptance of ancillary restraints, in practice results may 
vary. In addition, Japanese treatment of ancillary restraints presently is 
unclear. In Australia, without authorization, the ACCC limits the treatment of 
ancillary restraints to agreements carried out pursuant to joint venture 
agreements. However, while this is the example most often used, there are 
other situations in which competitors may have looser alliances that will not 
qualify strictly as a joint venture. In such a case, an ancillary agreement 
likely would be accepted in the United States and the European Union but 
not in Australia.  
On the other hand, there are situations in which the Australian system 
provides more leniency to parties acting together. The Australian system 
exempts any agreements carried out pursuant to a joint venture, regardless of 
whether it is merely ancillary or a major function of the agreement. In the 
United States and the European Union, it is unlikely that regulators would 
allow a price agreement that was not merely ancillary to the joint venture. 
Eleanor Fox stated: 
If a transaction is a legitimate joint venture (to share risks and talents 
and to get new or cheaper goods to market) but it also has 
anticompetitive risks, one would balance procompetitive and 
efficiency properties against anticompetitive and inefficiency 
properties. Then, if there is an obvious less restrictive course that 
would minimize anticompetitive potentials, the client would be 
advised to take it.104 
 104. Fox, supra note 39, at 20. 
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However, despite the administrative difficulties associated with both 
applying for and obtaining a formal exemption under the Australian or 
European systems, the fact that the United States considers hardcore price 
agreements or cartels to be highly suspect and less likely to attract the rule of 
reason analysis indicates that it may be nearly impossible to engage in per se 
conduct either in the U.S. or Japanese systems. Fox further argues that: 
[T]he more suspect the restraint, the more likely it is that the court will 
dispense with proof of purpose, power, and effect, or that it will 
require a strong justification, such as: The restraint is necessary or 
important to bring goods to market efficiently, in order to eliminate a 
free rider problem or for other reasons.105 
Australia and the European Union possess similar requirements of strong 
public benefits before they will authorize pure price agreements.106 
There are examples in each jurisdiction of price fixing and boycott 
arrangements that received some form of exemption. In particular, the 
European Union, Australia, and the United States treat agreements that create 
new products with some leniency. In Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc.,107 involving a suit against the American Society 
of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), respondent Columbia 
Broadcasting alleged that the policy of issuing blanket licenses, instead of 
specific work licenses, at set fees constituted price fixing. The Supreme 
Court held that the setting of prices was not a naked restraint of fees, but 
rather an ancillary component of the licensing.108 The Court held that the set 
fees enabled the blanket licenses to be effective.109 Broadcast Music 
emphasized that the licenses made available a product that would not exist 
otherwise. Similarly, in Remia, the European Commission determined that 
there was no breach of the EC Treaty when an agreement restrained 
competition that would not have existed without the agreement.110 In 
addition, in Radio 2UE Sydney in Australia, one factor that contributed to the 
court’s finding that the parties did not breach the T.P.A. was that the parties 
were producing with a competitor a new product that would not have existed 
otherwise, and that the parties to the agreement were still free to set their 
individual prices.111 Japan previously allowed agreements like the 
 105. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 106. See EUR. COMM’N, XXIVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1994, at 97 (1995). 
 107. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Case 42/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2545, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R.1.  
 111. (1982) 44 A.L.R. 557. 
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“Designated Bidding Systems,” which the JFTC listed as providing many 
benefits to the public (including allowing small firms to have equal access to 
publicly funded projects and avoid excessive competition), but since the 
Structural Impediments Initiative talks with the United States in 1988, the 
JFTC promised to strictly enforce the Antimonopoly Law against bid rigging 
in all industries.112 
VI. OTHER EXEMPTIONS 
The E.U. regime provides two unique conditional exemptions for crisis 
cartels, which are defined as “rationalization cartels in which there is chronic 
industry overcapacity.”113 Similar exemptions—for recession (fukyo) and 
rationalization (gorika) cartels conditional on JFTC approval114—existed in 
the Antimonopoly Law until 1999. In addition, the Japanese Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) often requests notification of conduct 
by industry participants in conformity with its administrative guidance 
obligations. However, unless the JFTC expressly exempts arrangements in 
accordance with Sections 21 through 24 of the Antimonopoly Law, the JFTC 
will challenge them.115 The JFTC steadily has decreased the number of 
available exemptions for cartels, from a high of 1,079 in 1965 to the current 
low of 40.116 In contrast, the T.P.A. expressly allows any conduct that 
Australian legislation expressly exempts from the T.P.A., although the 
Australian government is following the Japanese trend of reducing the 
number of legislative exemptions and tightening the Section 51(1) test.117 
U.S. antitrust law does not apply where express government exemptions 
exist.118 
 112. IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 33, at 90. 
 113. Eleanor M. Fox, US and EU Competition Law: A Comparison, in GLOBAL COMPETITION 
POLICY, supra note 14, at 342. 
 114. See John O. Haley, Japanese Antitrust Enforcement: Implications for United States Trade, 18 
N. KY. L. REV. 335, 345 (1991).  
 115. See JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMM’N, The Antimonopoly Act Guidelines Concerning 
Administrative Guidance (1994), available at http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/Japan/Decision/administ. 
html. 
 116. IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 33, at 359. 
 117. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 51(1) (Austl.). Legislation that provides exemptions from the 
Trade Practices Act is subject to a national competition policy review every three years in which an 
independent body must provide a report to the effect that the benefits from the restrictive legislation 
outweigh the anticompetitive effects. 
 118. See CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 189-213 (1959). 
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A. Guidelines, No Action Letters and Safety Zones 
Each jurisdiction provides guidelines on their individual enforcement 
approaches in particular industries and with respect to types of agreements. 
The U.S., E.U., and ACCC guidelines delineate safety zones, specifying 
thresholds beneath which the regulatory body is unlikely to take action. The 
guidelines describe other conditions and circumstances in which the 
regulatory body is unlikely to either be aggressive or take action. Although 
these guidelines provide some certainty to businesses, and many parties rely 
on them, it is unlikely that these broadly worded guidelines would bind the 
conduct of the regulatory bodies in an extreme situation. In addition, the 
guidelines do not bind private litigants who have rights to prosecute under 
the relevant antitrust legislation.  
The regulatory bodies in all four jurisdictions offer informal guidance and 
will provide “no action” or “comfort” letters indicating that they do not 
intend to take any action with regard to the particular conduct of the 
requesting parties. However, no action letters suffer from the same flaws as 
the representations made in the guidelines. Accordingly, they could never 
successfully take the place of either a formal exemption system or the rule of 
reason approach. In contrast, European Commission no action letters form 
legitimate exemptions for parties specified in guidelines pursuant to Article 
81(3) of the EC Treaty. In Japan, the JFTC has enforcement power and the 
ability to make its own recommendations, which may give its guidelines a 
more binding effect than guidelines in the other three jurisdictions. 
B. Intellectual Property 
All four jurisdictions possess some form of intellectual property 
exemptions. The U.S. DOJ created a safety zone for intellectual property, 
stating that: 
Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Agencies will not challenge a 
restraint in an intellectual property licensing arrangement if (1) the 
restraint is not facially anti-competitive and (2) the licensor and its 
licensees collectively account for no more than twenty percent of each 
relevant market . . .119 
 119. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 4.3 (Apr. 6, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
atr/public/ guidelines/ipguide.htm. 
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The European Union exempts pure patent and know-how licensing 
agreements under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty when certain requirements 
are met. In Japan and Australia, Section 23 of the Antimonopoly Law and 
Section 51(3) of the T.P.A. provide certain intellectual property 
exemptions,120 although the Australian government is in the process of 
reviewing Section 51(3) to determine whether it should continue to exist.  
In addition, the E.U.’s de minimis doctrine is unique, and in some ways 
contrary, to the per se doctrine that applies to price fixing. An agreement will 
escape detection under EC Treaty Article 81(1) if it does not have an 
appreciable impact on either competition or interstate trade. The European 
Commission clarified this by stating that it currently interpreted Article 81(1) 
to refer to either horizontal agreements where the aggregate market share of 
the parties does not exceed 10%, or vertical agreements with a market share 
of 15%, where the aggregate turnover does not exceed 300 million Euro.121  
An exemption that exists in the Japanese Antimonopoly Law arises from 
a loophole in the legislation. The extraterritoriality clauses do not capture 
purely foreign entities that neither have assets nor conduct business in Japan. 
C. Regulatory Enthusiasm 
One major difference between the jurisdictional approaches that is not 
technically an exemption but that provides a similar (although less 
predictable) result relates not to the law but to the regulatory body’s 
enthusiasm in pursuing price cartels. All four jurisdictions regulate hardcore 
cartels, but the European Commission’s insufficient investigative staff 
renders it unable to take on cases with the same devotion of the United 
States.122 In addition, the European Commission has political considerations 
in balancing its goals to ensure that the goals of a single market are not 
undermined by private collaboration with its reluctance to interfere with 
domestic issues of E.U. member states.123 On the other hand, U.S. antitrust 
law allows courts to award damages against blatant offenders. Both U.S. and 
Japanese legislation provide criminal sanctions for antitrust offenses, 
including jail sentences.  
 120. See JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING 
AGREEMENTS (1999), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/guideli/patent99.htm (last visited Mar. 
1, 2002); TRADE PRACTICES COMM’N, APPLICATION OF THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT TO 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 11-13 (1991), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/fs-pubs.htm. 
 121. Commission Notice, 2001 O.J. (C 368) 7. 
 122. Fox, supra note 113, at 353. 
 123. CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 37, at 892. 
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Between 1950 and 1970, Japan did not take on any bid rigging cases but 
has seen a steadily increasing number of price cartel cases ever since.124 The 
Structural Impediments Initiative talks, in which the United States 
encouraged Japan to take stronger action against anticompetitive conduct, 
motivated Japan, which now is very active in the area.125 
VII. CONCLUSION 
One can distill antitrust regulation in the United States, Japan, the 
European Union and Australia down to a single principle: price fixing and 
boycott conduct are harmful but the jurisdictions should allow public benefits 
and pro-competitive conduct to continue. However, it is apparent that the 
four jurisdictions use different methods to determine what conduct is 
criminal and what conduct will have positive results.   
In Australia and the European Union, pre-clearance systems exist through 
which parties can obtain authorization or declaration for proposed conduct 
that is in the public interest. This approach has many strengths, including the 
fact that parties have security in their business and the regulation is 
transparent and more likely to be uniform. On the other hand, for parties to 
have the aforementioned business security, the pre-clearance process requires 
that they engage in significant administrative measures to obtain pre-
clearance, including the revelation of business strategies and secrets to the 
regulators. The U.S. system contrasts with the Australian system in its rule of 
reason approach. The rule of reason takes two forms, as some courts allow 
conduct that has a net pro-competitive effect to continue while other courts 
focus on whether the restraint is ancillary to a larger operation that possesses 
net public benefits. In addition, recent U.S. case law has adopted a hybrid 
between both existing rule of reason approaches.  
It is possible to see elements in the exemption systems of the European 
Union, Australia, and Japan that have an effect similar to that of the two U.S. 
rule of reason approaches. The Japanese exemption system is still not 
perfectly clear because the Antimonopoly Law cases are less developed than 
the cases in the other three jurisdictions. However, the JFTC has taken a 
conservative approach in its enforcement, and the Keidanren has argued that 
the Antimonopoly Law does not extend to substantial restraints of trade that 
serve a legitimate social purpose, a view that has some support from 
Japanese courts. The rule of reason system, as opposed to a pre-clearance 
 124. See Antimonopoly Regulations, 4 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, Part IX § 3.06[4] (Zentaro 
Kitagawa ed., 2001). 
 125. IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 33, at 90. 
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system, is useful for industry because if a party believes that a court will clear 
its conduct, it can commence business immediately without having to go 
through the timely and expensive pre-clearance procedures required in 
Australia and the European Union. The downside of the rule of reason 
approach is that it lacks the surety that comes with pre-clearance. All four 
jurisdictions delineate “safety zones,” or non-binding thresholds beneath 
which they are unlikely to prosecute conduct. In addition, all four 
jurisdictions have other exemptions, including exemptions for conduct 
related to intellectual property, conduct that other jurisdictions expressly 
authorize, and conduct that meets the de minimis doctrine criteria.  
It appears that all four jurisdictions are gravitating toward stricter 
enforcement, which keeps with the growing awareness of competition law 
across the globe. However, given the different policy considerations that 
underlie these approaches together with the fact that the systems appear to 
meet the needs of each jurisdiction, it is unlikely that any of the four 
jurisdictions will amend their competition laws to co-align with the 
competition laws of any of the other jurisdictions. This seems to imply that a 
push for a global approach to competition policy would be a slow, if not 
impossible, process. 
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